Source: Sword Defense

The Tibetan plateau inhabits an elevation range where oxygen becomes hazardously scarce, and comprises a significant portion of the contentious border between China and India. Temperature extremes, altitude sickness, and perilous evacuation routes are a constant risk for military personnel here. It was in the winter of 2021 that in this theater, China opted to augment their forces with a small complement of soldiers undeterred by such adverse conditions. Having little need to hydrate or fear overexposure, equipped with 360-degree IR sensors to combat limited visibility, and brandishing light machine guns, NORINCO’s ambiguously-automated Sharp Claw I was deployed in number for the first time by the PLA. According to Indian defense reports, between 30 and 90 of the tracked “robot soldiers” were sent to assist Chinese forces in reconnaissance, communications, and patrolling along the Himalayan passes. While the Sharp Claw system’s lethality has yet to be combat-proven, these developments are indicative of an understated trend in militaries around the world: a growing acceptance of mass-casualty-causing weapons in automated hands. As several states that are innovators in this space find themselves engaged around the world, it may only be a matter of time before this technological rubicon is crossed in ground-based warfare, as it has in the air.

Sharp Claw I on a CCTV7 demo in April 2020

An Obfuscation in Popular Culture

Often the idea of the “robot soldier” conjures images from popular science fiction. Unstoppable, uncanny, but still variously humanoid in form. Well-known state-funded prototypes such as Russia’s Android Technics FEDOR, and the United States DARPA’s Atlas do little to disabuse us of this notion. In 2019, a convincing-but-computer-generated video depicting a “combat prototype” of the Atlas at a shooting range went viral. The video resonated on social media to a point that major news organizations felt the need to publish fact check articles three years later, as the reaction video community was still propagating it.

While the popular imagination is captured by these conceptions of robotics, the more achievable, and potentially far more destructive integration of automation in combat lies with less anthropomorphic designs for the time being. Tracked systems such as Sharp Claw are what is known as an Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle (UGCV) – similar unarmed systems are widely known as UGVs – and they are only one of hundreds of such designs already in service or currently being tested and developed by the world’s armies.

A Surprisingly Long History

A soldier in the 1940’s controlling a German “Goliath” tracked explosive

Technically speaking, a UGCV can be a device no more complicated than a remote-controlled car with an explosive payload, and they have indeed been tested since the 30’s and 40’s by German and Soviet engineers. In the time since, devices such as the TALON family of robots became well known during the Global War on Terror as devices for explosive ordinance disposal. 

Ghost Robotics’ Dogs of War

BigDog Source: Boston Dynamics

Another well-known DARPA-funded project from the United States was the Boston Dynamics BigDog. Developed from 2004 to 2015, it was the lab’s first walking robot, and was the progenitor to the now-famous “robot dog” design being widely distributed by Ghost Robotics for the defense industry, the Vision 60. Smaller, more adaptable, and substantially quieter than BigDog, the Vision 60 has slowly edged it out in the US and much of Europe as the preferred commercial and military design for a quadrupedal system, with adoption growing throughout the sector.

Sword Defense Systems’ SPUR Source: Sword Defense Systems

In October of 2021, one of Ghost Robotics’ partners, Sword Defense Systems, unveiled what may be the most controversial iteration to date of the Vision 60, the Special Purpose Unmanned Rifle (SPUR). Upon release of the SPUR, Sword Defense Systems emphatically states that the weapon is still completely reliant on a human operator. That said, both the weapon system and the Vision 60 device itself are networked, with the robot capable of autonomous operation even if the weapon system is not.

Unladen, the Vision 60 weighs in at 51 kg, has a runtime of three hours, and can cover a distance of 10km. It moves quietly at a brisk 10.8 km/h. 

On the SPUR model, the weapon, known as MOD 0, fires a 6.5mm Creedmoor round and carries a magazine load of ten. It boasts precision fire at 1200 meters. It can also be re-outfitted with 5.56 NATO standard ammunition at an unknown capacity. 

Examples Of Other Current UGCVs

China’s Sharp Claw I and II

Sharp Claw I dismounting from the SC II housing Source: Defense Update

Previously mentioned, China’s Sharp Claw I was announced in 2014, and is actually part of a complementary system with the larger Sharp Claw II. SCII is a 6×6 UGV designed for load utility and harsh terrain. It can transport troops, be utilized for CASEVAC, and explosive ordnance disposal operations. It comes with its own array of sensors and a smoke launcher system for evasive maneuvers.

The Sharp Claw II addresses a number of concerns regarding more practical, economically designed UGCV’s. It can carry the smaller, armed SCI further into operational territory, presumably acting as a communications hub and power source while the tracked SCI can continue to patrol.

Significantly heavier than its quadrupedal counterparts, Sharp Claw I weighs in at 120kg, and carries a light, belt-fed machine gun firing 7.62mm rounds. It houses what appears to be a 200 cartridge can with no visible reloading mechanism. Its systems are reported to be capable of autonomous operations, can operate at a remote distance of up to 800 meters for two hours, and moves at an estimated 9km/h. 

Ukraine’s Fantom and Piranya

The PJSC Piranya developed for the Ukrainian Army Source: Defence-UA

In a 2017 report from the Ukrainian Defense Review, the Ukrainian government outlined a need to develop automated systems quickly for operations in the Donbas, and stated a goal of having functional UGCVs by 2020. Some of the requirements outlined were a need for fast CASEVAC, integration with UAV systems, and modular capabilities with a variety of equipment and weapons systems. Two of the contracts awarded were for the Fantom multi-purpose UGCV and the Piranya Combat Support system.

The Fantom, unveiled in 2016, is another six wheeled platform meant for general utility, supply runs, power cannibalization, and CASEVAC. However, what distinguishes it from similar bots is the implementation of a 12.7x108mm heavy machine gun and larger ammunition reserves, making it capable of providing effective fire support and sustainment in protracted engagements.

The Piranya, a much smaller, tracked vehicle, is designed for closer engagements, and as of 2016, only had line-of-sight control capabilities. However, two traits that allow the Piranya to stand out are its ability to be outfitted with a number of small-and-large caliber weapons, and for its software control systems to be integrated with a number of scalable solutions. This “smartphone app” level software design has served Ukraine on other platforms with great success. 

It’s unclear at this point if Ukraine’s UGV systems have made significant appearances in combat since the Russian invasion in February 2022. What is known is that Ukraine has used a number of unmanned ground systems donated by NATO partners, including the Milrem Robotics THeMIS UGV.

Russia’s Uran-9

Russia’s Uran-9 model, on display before deployment in Syria Source: The International-Military Technical Forum

Russia’s military is no stranger to unmanned systems. A descendent of the Uran-6 demining robot, the Uran-9 is the only weapon on this list confirmed to have seen combat, though many of the reports were not favorable.

Carrying a 30mm auto-cannon and four Spiral-2 anti-tank guided missiles, the ten-ton vehicle is also the fastest UGCV tested, reaching speeds of 35km/h. Unveiled at the beginning of 2016, the Uran-9 was deployed two years later in Syria. Despite having promising capabilities as a fire-support vehicle, it allegedly performed with limited effectiveness.

Belarus’ Berserk (Centaur)

Source: Melanie Rovery on Twitter

First seen in 2018 at a military parade in Minsk, the Berserk is a heavy UGCV designed from the ground-up to be a sentry platform. It sports a pair of four-barrel 9-A-622 GShG-7.62 medium machine guns specifically designed to down low-flying aircraft. A press release from the Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange claims that it can detect incoming drones from three kilometers away and attack helicopters from ten, providing early warning to infantry if not a blanket of security. An anti-aircraft missile variation claims to be able to engage targets upwards of 5km away.

A main feature of the Berserk is its ability to automatically patrol along predetermined paths while being capable of autonomously detecting and analyzing threats. Unsurprisingly, there has been nothing released about whether or not the platform is capable of kill decisions on its own.

It remains to be seen whether or not Belarus will openly join the war in Ukraine. While many analysts and journalists say that it would be an extremely unwise decision for Russia’s most vocal ally to actively participate in the conflict, it’s still a subject of debate. Regarding what this means for automated and remote combat systems, though, this would put three nations who have been innovators in this space into direct conflict. While Fantom, Berserk, and Uran-9 are all designed for different operations, and at different stages of their implementation, the initiatives have been in place for enough time to facilitate a development cycle.

As of now, the only confirmed uses of UGVs in Ukraine have been of the unarmed varieties for CASEVAC and demining operations. That said, there are a number of alarming scenarios that could potentially manifest during Russia’s invasion causing the appeal of “robot soldiers” to be more resonant.

Potential Use Cases In Ukraine And Future Battlefields

At 0700 on the morning of February 24th, 2022, Russian soldiers marching south through Belarus mounted an attack against a target that may have sounded completely unthinkable to outsiders the day before: the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. As the day progressed, they would proceed to take the whole of the Exclusion Zone and establish supply and transit routes through the still highly-irradiated “Red Forest”. The soldiers were reported by workers to not be wearing any safety equipment through the radioactive dust clouds, even after Russian Army CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear) units arrived. It was clear that the race to control essential infrastructure and supply routes had gotten ahead of the advancing unit’s risk assessments. The fog of war and slow-acting nature of radiation will likely keep experts from knowing the full extent of how much damage was done to the occupying Russians. 

The occupation of Chernobyl grabbed the world’s attention in the early days of the invasion, but it wasn’t Russia’s only direct attack on a nuclear power plant. The Battle of Enerhodar and the advances on the Zaporizhzhia power plant further demonstrated the very real radiation risks on future European battlefields. Zaporizhzhia, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, had a number of its buildings directly targeted. Fires broke out that threatened the reactors’ safety measures, and had they not properly engaged and the reactors safely powered down, there could have been a major nuclear disaster.

May 2022, Orange-pink nitric acid cloud over Sievierodonetsk Source: @tvtoront on Twitter

Radiation isn’t the only CBRN risk that has been heightened during the Russian invasion. Explosions around sensitive infrastructure–intentional or otherwise–have already created further environmental hazards. During the Russian attacks on Sievierodonetsk, chemical plants were destroyed that released nitric acid and other industrial chemicals into the air over the city. 

Utilizing UGVs in hazardous areas is not a new concept. However, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated what was previously taboo: that objectives may have to be taken in CBRN environments with novel weapons systems. 

Another Ethical Crossroads

As demonstrated by the PLA on the Tibetan Plateau, a niche has already been created for mechanized warriors. In the United States, DARPA and partner firms like Ghost Robotics have identified that there is a growing market demand for these platforms. The horrors of the war in Ukraine have provided an ethical argument for putting robot soldiers in harm’s way to preserve the lives of both military and civilian personnel.

All of that considered, the optics and practical reality of “killer robots” are far from being accepted by the mainstream. Stop Killer Robots is an organization dedicated to researching and recommending public policy for the ethical advancement of artificial intelligence and automation-particularly in law enforcement and warfare settings. Boston Dynamics themselves has become a Stop Killer Robots affiliate, speaking out in a public statement against the weaponization of their designs, and pledging to never do so, themselves. 

The United Nations’ Office of Disarmament Affairs stated in October of 2019 that the evolution of UGCVs into what are being called LAWs (Lethal Autonomous Weapons) needs to be stopped, immediately. In the statement, they have defined this process as one wherein humans are currently “in the loop” (making necessary decisions) deteriorating into one where humans are “on the loop” wherein operators are just overseers and no longer making the decisions. The basis for this argument has six major points:

• Algorithmic bias – algorithms are fed by data that inevitably reflect various social biases, which, if applied in weapons, could cause people with certain profiles to be targeted disproportionately.
• Vulnerability to hacking – manufacturers could implant malicious technology and systems could be vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
• Morality and human context – machines are unable to infer traits about humans. The machine’s lack of understanding of context could also be problematic.
• Escalation – many countries are competing for market share in the international arms trade. The result could lead to thousands of machines that can compete with one another, changing the paradigm of war. Furthermore, less exposure to loss of domestic soldiers could lower political thresholds for resorting to the use of force.
• Machines are brittle – machine-learning algorithms are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks in which minor modifications to data inputs can trick them in ways no human would ever be fooled.
• Robot on robot violence would be indiscriminate in its destructive power – this could lead them to destroy public works, monuments or museums. –Liz O’Sullivan, International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC)

Despite all of this momentum, no sweeping international rules have been settled on regarding the automation of ground-based weapons systems. Not unlike the push to regulate UAVs and Loitering Munitions, it will take the full cooperation of the arms industry, the governments of nations such as the United States, Turkey, the Russian Federation, and other leading arms manufacturers. According to a 2021 Security Council memo on the situation in Libya, an “on the loop” kill decision may have already been made in a March 2020 incident with a loitering munition. The report states, “…The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability.” 

Is it only a matter of time before this is true of UGCVs?